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The FDIC's Special Assessment: Basing Deposit Insurance on
Assets Instead of Deposits
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2007, only three FDIC-insured institutions failed.' In the
following year, the number increased to twenty-six, and as the full
force of the financial crisis hit banks, 140 failed in 2009.2 The
FDIC insures failed banks' deposits through the Deposit Insurance
Fund (DIF)3 and is required to maintain the DIF's reserve ratio,
the ratio between the total amount of deposits insured and the
amount in the DIF, at or above 1.15 percent.4 The recent
exponential rise in bank failures has depleted the DIF' During
the second quarter of 2009 alone, the DIF decreased by $2.6
billion, falling to $10.4 billion 6 and putting the reserve ratio at .22
percent.7 This figure represented the lowest reserve ratio for the
insurance fund since 1993, and by the end of the third quarter of
2009, the FDIC announced that the insurance fund had a negative
balance of $8.2 billion.8 Under the Federal Deposit Insurance
Reform Act of 2005, 9 the FDIC is required to implement a

1. FDIC: Failed Bank List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/bank
list.html (last visited Feb. 6,2009).
2. Id; see also Bank Failure - 2009 Bank Failure, http://www.calculatorplus.com/
savings/advicejfailedbanks-2009.html (last visited Feb. 6,2010).
3. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (2008).
4. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817 (2009); FDIC, Deposit Insurance Fund Trends,
QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE (Second Quarter 2009), http://www2.fdic.gov/
qbp/2009jun/qbpdep.html#1 (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
5. Binyamin Appelbaum, Big Banks to Pay Larger Share of FDIC Levy; Fees to
Replenish Fund Altered After Protest by Small Institutions, WASH. POST, May 23,
2009, at A13, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/05/22/AR2009052203442.html.
6. FDIC, Deposit Insurance Fund Trends, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Id.; Eric Dash, As Bank Failures Rise, F.D.I.C. Fund Falls Into Red, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009 at B4, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/business/
economy/25fdic.html.
9. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817 (2009).
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"Restoration Plan" to raise the reserve ratio back up to 1.15
percent if it ever falls below that amount.'0
In October 2008, the FDIC instituted a Restoration Plan"
to replenish the depleted DIF. 2 As part of that plan, on May 22,3
2009, the FDIC announced that it would impose a five basis point1
special assessment. 4 This assessment was controversial because it
was based on an insured institution's assets instead of deposits. 5
The FDIC's ultimate decision to charge five basis points
per dollar in assets was reasonable, although it is a historic
departure from deposit insurance practice. 6 During a time of
economic difficulties, the special assessment not only increased the
DIF, but also maintained consumer confidence in the banking
industry. Part II of this note will briefly describe the historical

10. Special Assessments, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,639, 25,640 (May 29, 2009) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327).
11. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817 (2009).
12. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Adopts Restoration Plan--Proposes
Higher Assessments on Insured Banks; Also, Proposes Improvements to the Riskbased Assessment System (Oct. 7, 2008) http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/
2008/pr08094.html. The Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) is the fund that insures the
deposits of all institutions insured by the FDIC. See FDIC: Risk-Based Assessment
System, Current Status of Funds, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/200602/status_2006_02.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
13. This means that every one hundred dollars of assets will be taxed at five
cents. One basis point represents 1/100th of a percentage point. See Indep. Cmty.
Bankers of Am., FDIC Special Assessment Calculation Example, http://www.ic
ba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/FDICSpecialAssessmentEx.pdf.
14. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,640.
15. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,640; see generally Joe Adler,
Assessment to Penalize Large Banks; FDIC Proposes New Method Based on Assets,
Not Deposits, AM. BANKER., May 20, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 9540276
(showing how different groups reacted to the FDIC's proposed special assessment
being based on assets and not on deposits); Appelbaum, supra note 5 (explaining how
the change in assessment collection is a "victory for community banks"); Press
Release, Am. Bankers Ass'n, ABA Says FDIC Special Assessment Would Impede
Banpks' Role in Economic Recovery, Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.aba.com/Press+
Room/040209FDICSpecialAssessment.htm (describing why larger banks believe the
change in the assessment method would impede economic recovery); Press Release,
OCC News, Comptroller Dugan's Statement on the FDIC's Special Assessment Rule
(May 22, 2009), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2009-54.htm (stating why the
Comptroller is against the Special Assessment).
16. Letter from Norman R. Nelson, General Counsel, The Clearing House, to
Robert E. Feldman, Executive Sec'y, FDIC (May 21, 2009) at 5, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2009/09c1228no2AD35.PDF.
17. See Joe Adler, FDIC May Seek to Avoid New Assessment, AM. BANKER.,
Sept. 21, 2009, at 1, availableat 2009 WLNR 18395466.
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and legal context of the FDIC's mission." Part III will investigate
the statutory authority behind the rule change. 9 Part IV will
discuss the impact of the final rule on small banks as opposed to
large banks, 20 and Part V will discuss the public debate
surrounding the final rule. 21 Finally, Part VI will discuss the
FDIC's motivation to maintain independence during the financial
S• 22

crisis .

II. THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM AND THE
SPECIFICS OF THE FINAL RULE

A.

Introductionto the FederalDepositSystem

The FDIC, created by the Banking Act of 1933, 23 protects
bank deposits and prevents bank runs.24 It insures the deposits of
all banks and savings associations, and when one fails, the FDIC
liquidates it and disposes of its assets. 25 Currently, the FDIC will
insure deposits up to $250,0006 funded from the DIF.27 Insured
institutions finance the DIF through quarterly assessments,28
calculated in two steps, and is based on institutional risk and
18. See infra Part II, pp. 383-86.
19. See infra Part III, pp. 386-89.
20. See infra Part IV, pp. 389-91.
21. See infra Part V, pp. 391-99.
22. See infra Part VI, pp. 399-401.
23. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
24. Thomas K. McCraw, Regulate, Baby, Regulate, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 2009,
at 16, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/regulate-baby-regulate.
25. Other options for resolving a failed institution besides liquidating assets
include a purchase and assumption transaction with another institution and open
market assistance. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823 (2009).
26. Sandra Block, With CD Rates So Low, Plot Strategy and Shop for Best Deals,
USA TODAY, June 2, 2009, at 7B, available at 2009 WLNR 10407338; see Press
Release, FDIC, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 Temporarily
Increases Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 Per Depositor
(Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO8093.html (increasing
the insured amount from $100,000 to $250,000 on October 3, 2008); see also Helping
Families Save Their Homes Act, Pub.L. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009) (extending the
deadline for increasing the maximum amount covered by the FDIC to December 31,
2013).
27. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (2008).
28. FDIC, Risk Categories & Risk-Based Assessment Rates, http://www.fdic.govl
deposit/insurance/assessments/risk.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). Id.
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amount of deposits. 9 First, capital levels and supervisory ratings
determine into which of four risk levels the bank falls.3° Next, the
FDIC gives the bank a CAMELS rating, analyzing six different
factors: capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and
This analysis determines the
sensitivity to market risk."
appropriate assessment rate• 32for the bank which is then applied to
the total amount of deposits.
In 2009, the FDIC took a three-pronged approach to deal
with the depleting reserve fund.33 First, the FDIC increased the

regular quarterly assessment rate imposed on insured depository
institutions. 34 Second, the FDIC imposed a special assessment
calculated on assets, instead of deposits, payable by September of
2009. 3" Last, the FDIC accelerated the collection of regular
assessments by requiring all insured institutions (absent a waiver)
to prepay three years' worth of regular deposit insurance by the
end of 2009.36

B.

Specifics Regarding the Special Assessment

The FDIC adopted an "interim rule with request for
comment" on February 27, 200937 which imposed a special
assessment of twenty basis points on insured institutions' deposits

29. FDIC, Risk Categories & Risk-Based Assessment Rates, supra note 28.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. FDIC: Deposit Insurance Assessment, Sample I Invoice, http://www.fdic.gov/

deposit/insurance/assessments/ER2sample.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
33. See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Adopts Restoration Plan, supra note
12; see also Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Adopts Final Rule Imposing a Special
Assessment on Insured Depository Institutions (May 22, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/press/2009/pr09074.html (explaining the FDIC's decision to impose a
special assessment); see also Press Release, FDIC, Banks Tapped to Bolster FDIC
Resources; FDIC Board Approves Proposed Rule to Seek Prepayment of
Assessments (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr091
78.html (announcing the FDIC's decision to make banks prepay three years worth of
regular assessments).
34. Press Release, FDIC, Board Adopts Restoration Plan, supra note 12.
35. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Adopts Final Rule, supra note 33.
36. Stephen Labaton, Banks to Prepay Assessments to Rescue F.D.IC., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009 at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/business/

economy/30regulate.html.
37. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,640.
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and was to be collected by the end of the third quarter. 8 The
FDIC Board also reserved the right to impose an additional
special assessment of up to 10 basis points.39 The agency not only
requested comments on the interim rule, but also on alternatives
for calculating the assessment. 4° Comments included claims that
the FDIC was unfairly penalizing community banks, suggestions
that the FDIC tap the credit line with the U.S. Treasury, and
proposals that any special assessment be based on total assets
(minus tangible capital), not on total deposits. 1
The FDIC changed its position and adopted a final rule
42
very different from the interim rule.
Under the final rule, the
FDIC calculates the special assessment based on a flat rate on each
institution's assets reduced by any Tier 1 capital43 as reported by
the end of the second quarter." This assessment method is a
departure from the traditional calculation of the regular quarterly
assessment rate, which is a risk-adjusted rate applied to an
institution's deposits. 45 The FDIC also retained the option of
imposing two additional special assessments over the last two
quarters of 2009.46
The FDIC switched from the interim rule to the final rule
in part to reduce the "pro-cyclical" effects of the special
assessment because banks were struggling to lend money already.47
Increased taxes on banks faced with liquidity issues would only
exacerbate the problem. 48 By spreading the payments to the FDIC
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See e.g., Letter from Dennis J. Peters, Operations Officer, Timberwood Bank,
to Sheila Bair, Chairman, FDIC (March 3, 2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2009/09c475AD35.PDF ; see id. at 25643.
42. See id., at 25,640.
43. Tier 1 Capital is comprised by the following elements: (1) Common
stockholder's equity; (2) Noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and related
surplus; and (3) Minority interests in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries.
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A (2009).
44. FDIC, Deposit Insurance Fund Trends, supra note 4; Press Release, FDIC,
FDIC Adopts Final Rule, supra note 33.
45. See FDIC: Deposit Insurance Assessment, Sample 1 Invoice, supra note 32;
see supra pp. X-Y and notes 28-32.
46. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,642.
47. Id. at 25,641.
48. See Press Release, OCC News, supra note 15.
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out over time, the assessment might have a lesser negative impact
on a bank's earnings in any one quarter. 49 The FDIC, however,
ultimately decided to make banks prepay three years worth of
regular assessments to address pro-cyclical effects instead of
collecting additional special assessments. ° Under this plan, banks
could record prepayments as an asset and then record each
quarter's assessment as an expense as it became due."'
Prepayment will not negatively impact bank earnings, but it will
negatively impact banks' liquidity.
The efforts to reduce procyclical effects of the special assessment were appropriate because
bank failures surged as problems in the financial sector continued
into the fall of 2009.53
III. STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The FDIC has an express delegation of authority to
regulate and establish and risk-based assessments system based on
12 U.S.C.A. § 1817. The FDIC also claims that it has implied
authority to impose a special assessment based on assets under
Section 7(b)(5) of the Federal Deposit Improvement Act
(FDIA). 4 The FDIA provides that the FDIC may "impose one or
more special assessments on insured depository institutions" for
any necessary purpose in an amount determined by the FDIC.5
To assess the validity of a federal agency's interpretation of
a statute where the statutory language is silent or ambiguous, the
agency's interpretation will control if it is a "permissible
49. Labaton, Banks to PrepayAssessments, supra note 36. The final rule reduces
the assessment amount from a one-time twenty basis point assessment to a five basis
point assessment with the possibility of two additional assessments of the same rate.
Special Assessments, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,639 at 25,639-40.
50. See Labaton, Banks to Prepay Assessments, supra note 36.
51. Id.
52. See Editorial, The F.D.LC. and the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A22,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/opinion/28monl.html.
53. Eric Dash, Failures of Small Banks Grow, Straining F.D..C., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/ll/business/eco
nomy/llbanks.html.
54. 12 U.S.C.A § 1817 (2009); Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,641
(explaining how the statute does not define the assessment base to be used when
imposing a special assessment).
55. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,641.
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construction of the statute. 5 6 The statute does not define the
assessment base for making a special assessment; however,
Congress's statutory delegation of authority5 7 implicitly permits the
FDIC to define the appropriate assessment base for the special
18
Often when Congress delegates
assessment by rulemaking.
authority to a regulatory agency, it gives the agency discretion to
The agency's interpretation of the
administer the statute.59
unless the interpretation is
is
controlling
statute
authorizing
"capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 6 Furthermore,
the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 repealed
provisions which defined "assessment" in any specific way, and
this seems to justify the FDIC's use of discretion to interpret the
statute.61 Because no specific definition of assessment was put in
place afterwards, Congress intended to give the FDIC more
discretion. 62
Several major banks disagree with the FDIC's
interpretation of the statute. Norman Nelson, general counsel for
The Clearing House,6' a trade group representing some of the
United State's largest banks, argues that the FDIC's imposition of
the special assessment "inappropriate" under the relevant
statutes.64 According to Nelson, a threat of systemic risk is the
only situation where the FDIC can base an emergency special
assessment on insured institutions' total assets. 6' A systemic risk
determination involves a number of agencies and actors: the
Treasury Secretary can determine systemic risk after consultation
56. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984).
57. See Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,641.
58. See Chevron USA, 467 U.S.at 843; Special Assessments, supra note 10, at
25,641.
59. Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 865.
60. Id. at 843-44.
61. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. 102-242,
105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
62. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,641.
63. Represented banks include ABN AMRO Bank, Bank of America, Bank of
New York Mellon, Citigroup's Citibank, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, UBS,
U.S. Bancorp's U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo. See Joe Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest
FDIC-Planned Asset Levy, AM. BANKER., May 22, 2009, at 16, available at 2009
WLNR 9708980.
64. Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 2.
65. Id.
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with the President and input from the FDIC Board and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 66 Instead, the FDIC bases its
authority to impose the special assessment on its general
authority 67 to recapitalize the DIF when the reserve ratio drops
below 1.15 percent.'
Nelson also argues that the agency acted inconsistently with
the FDIA. 69 The FDIA, which provides that "[n]o insured
depository institution shall be barred from the lowest-risk category
solely because of size,"7° was intended to prevent discriminatory
assessments on large depository institutions." If the special
assessment were based on assets, larger banks, with
disproportionately more assets than smaller banks, would pay a
the DIF.1
greater share of the special assessment used to rebuild
The discrepancy between the FDIC and the Clearing
House's interpretations of the agency's authority exists because
the two sides focus on different statutory provisions. The Clearing
House looks to 12 U.C.S. § 1823, 73 while the FDIC justifies the
special assessment under its general authority in 12 U.S.C.A. §
1817. 74 The Clearing House's argument that the FDIC is acting
inappropriately focuses on lack of process in the FDIC's decision:
the relevant agencies have not officially determined that a systemic
risk emergency exists. 75 The special assessment statute, relied on

66. A situation of systemic risk is an emergency determination by the Secretary
of the Treasury. Other agencies that are involved in determining whether a systemic
risk situation exists are the board of directors of the FDIC, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(2009); see Letter
from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 2.
67. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817 (2009).
68. Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E,Feldman, supra note 16, at 6.
69. Id. at 2-3.
70. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817(b)(2)(D)(2009).
71. Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 5.
72. Another reason the FDIC switched from the interim rule to the final rule is
because larger banks which hold a higher proportion of assets to deposits than
smaller banks, would pay a greater proportion of the special assessment to increase
the DIF. See Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,644. See Appelbaum, supra
note 5.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(2009); Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E.
Feldman, supra note 16, at 2.
74. See 12 U.S.C.A §1817 (2009).
75. Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 7.
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by the FDIC, however, does not require a finding of systemic
risk.6
Even if the Clearing House is correct that a finding of
systemic risk is a necessary precondition for the imposition of a
special assessment, arguably, this condition was fulfilled when the
FDIC established the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP).77 The FDIC introduced this program to avoid serious
risks associated with the economic and financial crisis after
October 13, 2008 when the Treasury Secretary (after consultation
with the President, following recommendations from the FDIC
Board and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve)
determined that systemic risk existed. 78 The only remaining issue
is whether this systemic risk determination expired by the time the
FDIC imposed the special assessment. 79 Assuming that the
systemic risk determination has not expired as of May 2009, then
the Clearing House has no argument to delegitimize the statutory
authority of the Special Assessment.
Overall, the FDIC's
interpretation of section 181780 is a permissible interpretation
of
81
the agency's implicit authority to make special assessments.

IV.
A.

IMPACT ON LARGE BANKS AND SMALL BANKS

The GeneralImpact on Large and Small Banks

The FDIC's final rule will have a greater impact on large
banks than on small banks82 because large banks will pay a greater
proportion of the special assessment.83 Small banks "tend to have
76. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817 (2009).
77. See 12 C.F.R. § 370 (2008).
78. Id.

79. Mike Krimminger, Senior Policy Advisor to the Chairman, FDIC, Speech on
Systemic Risk to Professor Lissa Broome's Banking Law class, University of North
Carolina School of Law, (Nov. 13, 2009).
80. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817 (2009).
81. See Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 843. Chevron held that if a statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to a specific issue in an agency's construction of the statute it
administers, the question is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
interpretation. Id.
82. Large banks are generally banks with more than $100 billion in assets and
small banks are those with less than $100 billion in assets. Appelbaum, supra note 5.
83. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,644.

390
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roughly the same amount of assets and deposits, because they lend
to borrowers what they collect from depositors." 84 Large banks
lend from multiple sources, such as borrowed money, so their
assets may exceed their deposits by a greater percentage than
smaller banks which do not typically use alternative sources of
funding.85 Thus, when the FDIC made the decision to change the
assessment base from deposits to assets, small banks were
benefitted because they will pay a lower proportion of the special
assessment than under the interim rule.86 News sources hailed this
as a victory for smaller banks. 7
B.

Projectedand Actual Results on Larger Banks

Financial estimates show the disparate way in which the
special assessment would impact small and large banks. Citibank
estimated it would pay a premium ranging from $578 to $809
million under the final rule.88 If the assessment was based on
deposits, Citibank's premium would fall between $120 and $168
million.89 State Street Bank and Trust is projected to pay an
additional $10 million in premiums under the final rule.9°
Goldman Sachs Group was projecting an increase of $5 million
under the final rule.91 JPMorgan Chase & Co. has paid $675
million out of second quarter earnings and Wells Fargo & Co.,
84. Appelbaum, supra note 5.
85. Large banks more readily than small banks hold other assets such as
commercial paper and securities. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member of Board of United
States Federal Reserve Board, Large Banks and Small Banks in an Era of Systemic
Risk Regulation, Speech at the North Carolina Bankers Association Annual
Convention (June 15, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tar
ullo20090615a.htm; Krimminger, supra note 79; Appelbaum, supra note 5 (defining
what is a large bank).
86. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,643-44.
87. Appelbaum, supra note 5; Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-Planned
Asset Levy, supra note 63.
88. Adler, Assessment to Penalize Large Banks, supra note 15, at 1.
89. Id.
90. Joe Adler, Gauge of Premium Hits Gets Clearer,AM. BANKER., May 21, 2009

at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 9616996.
91. Id.
92. Marshall Eckblad and Brett Philbin, Some Banks Send Their FDIC Bills to
Business Customers, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, July 29, 2009, http://www.nasdaq.com/

aspx/stock-market-news-story.aspx?storyid=200907291519dowjonesdjonlineOO0852&
title=some-banks-send-their-fdic-bills-to-business-customers-.
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which has more than ten thousand branches, has paid $565 million
to the FDIC under the final rule.93 By changing the assessment
base, the FDIC would collect $500 million more in assessments
from large banks than what it would have collected under the
interim rule.94 Because of the significant impact on larger banks,
the ensuing debate focused on whether this was a prudent decision
given economic conditions.
V. THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT

After the FDIC announced its interim rule, different
groups and individuals sent 14,000 comment letters in response. 95
The interim rule proposed an assessment base similar to regular
quarterly assessments, but the FDIC specifically asked for
comments regarding the use of a different assessment base. 96 The
potential for a historic break from deposit insurance practice
polarized large banks and small banks. 97
A.

Equity Concerns Regarding the Special Assessment.

Banks favoring the final rule argued that it was fair because
of the role and treatment of larger banks in the financial collapse,98
believing that smaller community lenders had a more limited role
in subprime lending which was at the heart of the financial
collapse. 99 Karen Thomas, director of government relations at the
Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA), believes

93. Id.
94. See Appelbaum, supra note 5.
95. Margaret Chadbourn, Banks to Pay Higher Fees to Build FDIC Insurance
Fund, BLOOMBERG, May 22, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060
2002&sid=aYAyj3l5lsUc.
96. See Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 7
(responding to the prospect of a special assessment at the FDIC's request).
97. See Appelbaum, supra note 5.
98. See Press Release, Indep. Comty. Bankers of Am., ICBA Lauds FDIC's
Decision to Cut Special Assessment, Base on Assets (May 22, 2009), http://www.ic
ba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=59191&sn.ItemNumber=1733.
99. See Laura Glasser, Small Banks Hammered by FDIC Fees, LONG ISLAND
Bus. NEWS, July 24, 2009, http://libn.com/blog/2009/07/24/small-banks-hammered-by-

fdic-fees.
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that large banks are getting what they deserve.' ° She argues that
large banks' risky lending and investment practices caused the
increase in bank failures which has in turn depleted the DIF.'°' In
2008, most of the cost to the DIF came from the resolution of
IndyMac Bank F.S.B. which had $32 billion in assets and $19
billion in deposits.' °2 Furthermore, making large banks pay higher
special assessment fees is more equitable because larger banks
generally had earlier and easier access to the Troubled Access
Relief Program (TARP) money than smaller banks.'0 3 Smaller
banks had to go through more onerous procedures to receive
TARP assistance)

°4

The ICBA also stated that a special assessment based on
deposits, even if it were just ten basis points per dollar of deposits,
will unfairly penalize community banks who are trying to increase
lending in their communities.'
According to ICBA surveys,
thirty-two percent of member banks estimated that the special
assessment based on deposits will absorb between sixteen and
twenty-five percent of their 2009 earnings, and seventeen percent
estimated it will consume between twenty-six and forty percent of
earnings.'"
The survey showed that thirty-one percent of
respondents believe the assessment under the interim rule will
noticeably affect their ability to lend to local communities. 0 7
Overall, community bankers felt the interim
rule punished them
108
create.
not
did
they
that
for financial turmoil

100. See Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedLevy, supra note 63, at
16.
101. See id.
102. See Letter from Karen Thomas, Exec. Vice President, Indep. Comty. Bankers
of Am., to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec'y, FDIC (Apr. 2, 2009), at 6-7, available at
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/clO40209.pdf (explaining the impact of
IndyMac Bank F.S.B. on the DIF). Although a bank worth $32 billion is not a "large
bank" according the definition stated previously, it is much larger than the average
sized bank of $1.5 million which failed between January 2008 and mid-May 2009.
Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedLevy, supra note 63, at 16; see supra
p. 389 and note 82 ; see Appelbaum, supra note 5 (defining a "large bank").
103. Letter from Karen Thomas to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 102, at 4.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 3.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 3.
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Chairman Sheila Bair agreed stating that collecting more
money from the largest banks was a "step back toward equity. ' 1°9
According to Bair, "[o]ver the past eighteen months, large banks,
as a group, have posed much greater risks to the banking system
than small banks have."' 0 The interim rule's charge of twenty
basis points on deposits significantly hurt smaller banks
disproportionately because they are less diversified and have fewer
sources of income to absorb the assessment fee than larger
banks."'
In contrast, the Comptroller of the Currency, John Dugan,
a member of the FDIC board of directors, voted against the final
rule because he believes that the financial crisis was caused in part
by smaller banks' excessive lending in the commercial real estate
market rather than financial instability caused by large banks."'
He believes large banks were not responsible for smaller banks
making loans secured by commercial real estate funded by
brokered deposits.1 3 This combination contributed to the fact that
many of the bank failures in 2008 and 200911 were smaller banks."5
Only one institution that has failed since January 2008,
Washington Mutual Incorporated (Washington Mutual), had more
than $50 billion in assets. 16 In fact, the average size of assets held
by the other fifty-seven bank failures between January 2008 and
mid-May 2009 was $1.5 billion.'1 7 Recently, the FDIC has
experienced losses between forty and fifty percent after selling
small banks that it took over." 8 By contrast, the failure of

109. Appelbaum, supra note 5.
110. Id.
111. Glasser, supra note 99.
112. See Press Release, OCC News, supra note 15.
113. Id.
114. Lingling Wei, Small Banks Face Hits on Commercial Real Estate,WALL ST. J.,
May 5, 2009, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124148130773284
927.html.
115. Washington Mutual had $307 billion in assets. Adler, Big Bank Groups
ProtestFDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra note 63, at 16.
116. Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra note 63, at
16.
117. Id.
118. Laura Bruce, The FDIC Deals with Mounting Bank Failures, BANKRATE,
Mar. 20, 2009, http://www.bankrate.com/finance/savings/the-fdic-deals-with-mounting
-bank-failures-l.aspx.
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Washington Mutual produced no loss to the DIF when the FDIC
sold it to JPMorgan Chase & Co." 9 Looking solely at 2009, all
banks that failed had less than $50 billion in assets' 20 with the
largest failure being Colonial BancGroup Incorporated which had
$25 billion in assets. 2'
Large banks are also mitigating costs to the DIF and the
overall impact of the financial crisis by purchasing failed
institutions."' For example, Bank of America Corporation (Bank
of America) acquired Countrywide Financial Corporation,
JPMorgan Chase & Co. acquired Washington Mutual, and Wells
Fargo & Co. acquired Wachovia Corporation.' 23 Without these
actions, the FDIC would have made larger payouts to insured
depositors at these banks. For example, Washington Mutual
which was the largest bank failure in U.S history, had
$188.3
12
billion in deposits 24 insured by the FDIC before it failed.'
B.

Why Small Banks Continue to Fail

If larger banks have caused the financial crisis, and not
small banks, as stated by the ICBA, why are most of the
institutions failing small banks? 2 6 The answer is twofold: 1)
smaller banks have had disproportionately more exposure to
commercial real-estate loans than larger banks; 127 and 2) larger
banks have received federal aid in the form of preferred stock
purchases before small institutions were given similar access.1
28

119. Id.
120. See Bank Failure - 2009 Bank Failure, http://www.calculatorplus.com/savings/
advicefailedbanks-2009.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
121. Id.
122. See Adler, Assessment to Penalize Large Banks, supra note 15, at 1.
123. See id.
124. Office of Thrift Supervision, Fact Sheet Washington Mutual Bank, at 1 (Sept.
25, 2008), available at http://files.ots.treas.govn3O021.pdf.
125. See Eric Dash and Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells
Some Assets, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2008, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/26/business/26wamu.html.
126. See, e.g., Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra
note 63, at 16 (explaining how the average size of 57 of 58 banks that failed since
January of 2008 was only $1.5 billion in assets).
127. See Wei, supra note 114.
128. Nancy Cook, Bank on More Failures, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/214036; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., TROUBLED
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During the housing boom smaller and medium-sized banks
lent to home builders and commercial property developers
because they could not compete in the home mortgage market
with large banks and Wall Street firms.129 Over-development of
commercial real estate and the housing crisis came to bear on all
parts of the economy, and many of the loans made by these
smaller banks defaulted. " ° Unlike the larger banks who were
holding problematic mortgage-backed securities, small banks got
into trouble because their traditional loans went into default."'
Based on stress test results in the spring of 2009, federal regulators
predicted that an estimated 581 small banks were at risk of
collapse by 2011 when applying only the commercial real estate
loss assumptions. 112 On the other hand, none of the nation's
nineteen largest banks, and only about five percent of the next 100
lenders at risk of collapse, faced significant commercial real estate
losses.
Larger banks may be indirectly responsible for the failure
of smaller banks if they forced smaller banks out of the home
mortgage market and into the commercial real estate market.'34
Arguably, however, being "forced out" is merely a function of fair
competition. More importantly, it is not true that one market was
clearly better than another because home mortgage defaults meant
write downs of the value of the toxic securities leading to the
demise of larger banks and Wall Street firms. 135 Nevertheless, even
though both types of institutions held problematic assets, larger
institutions received earlier assistance from the federal
government. 136 It is within this context that the FDIC imposed a
higher proportion of the special assessment on larger institutions.137
(July 9, 2009), http://www.ga
o.gov/new.items/d09889t.pdf.
129. Wei, supra note 114.
130. See Cook, supra note 128.
131. See id.
132. Dash, Small Banks FailureRate Grows, StrainingFD.I C., supra note 53.
133. See id.
134. See Wei, supra note 114.
135. See Cook, supra note 128.
136. Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra note 63, at
16.
137. Chadbourn, supra note 95.
REPURCHASES OF PREFERRED STOCK AND WARRANTS,
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A Better Reflection of Risk?

Some observers suggested that basing assessments on assets
is a better actuarial method of assessing risk to the DIF.138
Accordingly, a bank's assets is a better measure of risk because
bad assets, not deposits, cause bank failures.1 39 The FDIC's
Problem Bank List14° estimates that there are approximately $332
billion in loans or leases on which borrowers have stopped making
payments as of August 27, 2009.141 Larger banks such as Citigroup
Corporation (Citigroup) and Bank of America are not on this
problem list because they receive hundreds of billions of dollars in
taxpayer support .142 Adding them to list, however, would increase
143
the total number of toxic assets tenfold to three trillion dollars.
In terms of fairness, basing premiums on assets may be a more
accurate measurement because when the FDIC takes over a bank,
its losses are based on the value of the assets of the bank.1 44 The
FDIC does not assume just the deposits of a failed bank but it
assumes other liabilities as well. 45
In response to the idea that premiums based on assets is a
better measure of risk, Norman Nelson, General Counsel of the
Clearing House group, states that this is "out of line with the
FDIC's core mission, which is to insure deposits., 146 Risk to the
DIF does not arise from assets but from FDIC insured deposits. 147
Furthermore, an increased ratio of assets to deposits does not
138. See Letter from Karen Thomas to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 102, at 6.
139. Id.
140. See Alison Vekshin, FDIC List of Problem Banks Surges, Putting Reserve
Fund at Risk, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?

pid=20601087&sid=ajDHMyQ5oDKs.
Problem banks are those that fail the FDIC's grading system for asset quality,
liquidity, and earnings. See id.
141. Rolfe Winkler, For FDIC,A Long Tunnel and Little Light, REUTERS BLOGS
(Aug. 27, 2009, 15:03 EDT), http://blogs.reuters.com/rolfe-winkler/2009/08/27/forfdic-a-long-tunnel-and-little-light/.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Adler, Assessment to Penalize Large Banks, supra note 15, at 1.
145. See FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, 67 (2003), availableat http://www.fdic.gov/

bank/historical/reshandbook/ch7recvr.pdf.
146. Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra note 63, at

16.
147. Id.
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necessarily increase risk to the DIF. 4' Assets are only dangerous
to a bank's stability if they are based on problematic securities like
the $55 billion in subprime loans held by Citigroup. 49 Often,
holding other types of assets besides deposits can increase the
health of a bank by diversifying risk. °
Many comments submitted to the FDIC argued either that
assessments based on assets would decrease the burden on smaller
5
1
banks, or that assets are a better measure of risk to the DIF.1
Evidence supports the former argument more than the latter.152 In
the final rule, the FDIC explained that it did not favor using a risk
based system like that used for regular quarterly assessments.15'
The primary purpose of the special assessment was to build up the
DIF and not to reflect the risk of future failures.1 14 A risk-based
special assessment would result in a premium too large for the
riskiest institutions because the special assessment would be in
While FDIC may have
addition to the regular assessments.
considered the role that larger institutions played in the financial
collapse, their access to TARP funds, and the vulnerability of
smaller-community banks during this economic crisis, it cannot be
said that the FDIC based its assessment on assets instead of
deposits to more accurately reflect risk to the DIF.
D.

Additional Criticisms of the Final Rule
1. Lack of Notice

Some critics claimed that the final rule violated due process
because it was an abrupt change from the former interim rule

148. Id.
149. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106,
113 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining how Citigroup faced billions of dollars in losses
because of its extensive use of collateralized debt obligations).
150. See Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra notel6, at 45.
151. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,643-44.
152. Id. at 25,643-44.
153. Id. 25,643.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 25,643-44.
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without sufficient time for public comment.5 6 Given the dramatic
change from seventy-five years of deposit insurance history,'57
large banks believe it is unfair to change the assessment base
without an opportunity for all interested parties to present
meaningful comments on a detailed proposal. 5 After the FDIC
made the final rule, no formal means existed by which interested
parties could convince the agency that it had made a mistake.159
The FDIC believed, however, that it provided the public
and the banking industry with sufficient opportunity to
comment.' 6 Although the final rule meant the special assessment
was based on assets, the FDIC specifically asked for comments
regarding whether assessments should be based on assets or some
other measure and whether the special assessments should account
for assistance being provided to systemically important
institutions. 161 In response, many commentators agreed that the
special assessment should be based on assets because it both
reduced the burden on smaller banks and was a more accurate
measure of risk.'62 Thus, the claim that the FDIC's switch to the
final rule based on lack of notice is unjustified.'63
2. Perverse Incentives
Another criticism was that the final rule introduced
perverse incentives for the banking industry. '6 Taxing assets
instead of deposits could entice institutions to move assets off of
their balance sheets into nonbank entities making those assets
unavailable to cushion the bank when it is at risk of failing.
156. See Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra note
63, at 16.
157. Letter from Norman R. Nelson to E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 1.
158. See Adler, Big Bank Groups Protest FDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra note
63, at 16.
159. See Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 7.
160. See Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,644.
161. Id. at 25,643.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Press Release, OCC News, supra note 15.
165. Adler, Big Bank Groups ProtestFDIC-PlannedAsset Levy, supra note 63, at
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Also, banking supervisors historically encourage institutions to
diversify their funding bases beyond deposits, but the final rule
would punish banks that use alternative funding sources. '66
Furthermore, this policy may give off the false impression that
assets are insured instead of deposits. 67 The mission of the FDIC
has always been to insure deposits so that the public will keep its
money in banks, not to protect against other assets a bank might
hold.'6 8 The fact that the FDIC has recently decided not to collect
any more special assessments
based on assets precludes this from
69
concern.1
legitimate
a
being
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Critics of Chairman Bair have stated that the FDIC's
decision to base the special assessment on assets represents
changed policy objectives among FDIC leadership. ° Some
evidence suggests that the FDIC is taking a more active role in
economic recovery but for the most part, the FDIC's decision to
impose the special assessment is a reaction against the practice of
bailing out banks deemed "too big to fail.' 17' Imposition of the
special assessment also reemphasizes the agency's traditional
mission of2 maintaining public confidence in the nation's banking
17
industry.
A.

Evidence of More Active Role for the FDIC?

The FDIC inevitably plays a more significant role if the
financial system is in trouble because of its duty to insure
166. Letter from Norman R. Nelson to Robert E. Feldman, supra note 16, at 4-5.
167. Id.
168. See supra p. 383 and notes 23-25.
169. See supra p. 386 and note 50.
170. See Appelbaum, supra note 5.
171. See Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, As U.S. Overhauls the Banking
System 2 Top Regulators Feud, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at At, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06114/us/politics/14power.html(showing how Chairman
Bair disapproved of the federal bail-outs to larger banks and how she thought the
special assessment was an equitable response).
172. FDIC: Fostering Consumer Confidence in Banking, What is the FDIC's
Responsibility to the Consumer?, http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/questions/consumer/
responsibility.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
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deposits.173 To fulfill this duty, the FDIC must shore up the DIF so
that funds are available for failed banks. 71 4 One analyst estimated
that the FDIC will have to collect as much as $45 billion through
2013 to raise the DIF's reserve ratio to 1.15 percent, the amount
that is required by law.17
Additionally, Chairman Bair has
publicly opined on the need to depart from the "too-big to fail"
system.116 Instead of resorting to federal bail-outs, she argues that
financial firms generally, not just banks and thrifts, should go
through FDIC insolvency procedures should they fail.'77 Bair
wants to bring these institutions directly within the FDIC's
traditional regulatory powers through a system that deals with
failures outside of the bankruptcy process. 8 Bair's statements
suggest that the FDIC's desire for an increased regulatory
presence during the economic crisis is more reactionary than
reflective of a fundamental shift in policy objectives.
B.

Desire for Regulatory Independence

While Chairman Bair's leadership may indicate a desire for
a more active role during this financial crisis, throughout the
interim rule's comment period, the FDIC reiterated its
unwillingness to borrow from its line of credit with Treasury to
fund expected losses.7 9 The FDIC has never taken any tax money
to fulfill its mission, and it does not want to change that.'8 The
FDIC has always been funded by the insured institutions, and it

173. See supra p. 383 and notes 23-24; Michael R. Crittenden, FDIC Chief Wants
Broader Federal Powers, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at C3, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB124160808837591441.html.
174. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,640.
175. Joe Adler, New Puzzler: Does Size of DIF Matter?, AM. BANKER., Dec. 22,
2009, at 1, availableat 2009 WLNR 25680681.
176. See, e.g., Crittenden, supra note 173 (recounting Blair's statements to the
Senate Banking Committee that "a 'handful of giant institutions with global reach'
and a single regulator is a recipe for mistakes.").
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Special Assessments, supra note 10, at 25,643.
180. See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves 2010 Operating Budget
(Dec. 15, 2009) http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9228.html (showing
Bair's statement that the FDIC is fully funded by individual banks around the
country).
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does not want to depend on taxpayers to fund the deposit
insurance system.
Furthermore, Bair is concerned that
borrowing from the Treasury would harm the FDIC's public image
because the public may view this reliance as another taxpayer
bailout for the banking industry.1 82 On the day that the FDIC
collected the special assessment, Bair announced that the FDIC
would not levy further special assessments. 183 Instead, the FDIC
required banks to prepay three years' of their regular assessments
by December 31, 2009 to show the public that the industry "will
'' 4
not simply tap the shoulder of the increasingly weary taxpayer.
VII. CONCLUSION

The FDIC's decision to impose a special assessment based
on banks' assets instead of deposits to shore up the DIF was a
rational decision despite being a break with deposit insurance
practice. First, the FDIC wanted larger banks to bear more of the
burden in building up the DIF primarily because larger banks
benefitted from federal assistance before most small banks and
because of smaller banks' unstable financial position.18 1 Second,
the FDIC wanted to avoid pro-cyclical effects of a special
assessment by charging only five basis points minus Tier-1 capital
and allowing for subsequent special assessments spread out over
time.1 86 These were reasonable concerns because banks continued
to fail well into the fall of 2009.'87 Third, the FDIC wanted to
maintain public confidence by not exercising its option to borrow
from the Treasury. The FDIC's decision to make banks prepay
three years worth of regular assessments instead of borrowing
181. See Labaton, Banks to Prepay Assessments, supra note 36.
182. See Adler, FDIC May Seek to Avoid New Assessment, supra note 17, at 1
(explaining how Bair has been reluctant to borrow from the Treasury); see also
Labaton, Banks to Prepay Assessments, supra note 36 (showing how Bair believes
that making banks prepay assessments will signal to the public that the federal
government will not bail out the banking industry).
183. See Labaton, Banks to Prepay Assessments, supra note 36.
184. Id.
185. See supra pp. 389-93 and notes 82-111.
186. See supra pp. 385-86 and notes 47-49.
187. See supra p. 386 and notes 50-53.
188. See supra pp. 400-01 and notes 179-183.
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from the Treasury emphasized its commitment to agency
independence.1 89 How banks, large and small, will fare from this
special assessment and whether the FDIC will be able to
successfully increase the reserve ratio remains to be seen.

PETER S. KIM

189. See supra p. 401 and note 184.

